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THE WAIVER OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION:
KENT REVISITED
F. THOMAS SCHIORNHORSTj-
I. INTRODUCTION
just as Miranda' dropped Escobedo's' other shoe, so did In re
Gault3 relieve and exacerbate the apprehensions created a year earlier
when the United States Supreme Court held its first "childrens hour"'
in Kent v. United States.' Since Gault has given us so many new things to
worry about, the very narrow focus of Kent-the limitations on a
juvenile court's exercise of its statutory power to relinquish its juris-
diction so that certain minors may be tried as adult criminals-has
been given little attention in the professional literature.6
Kent presented the issue of whether a sixteen year-old boy charged
with housebreaking, robbery, and rape was properly transferred from
the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the District of Columbia's juvenile court
to the United States District Court where he was found guilty on six
counts of housebreaking and robbery, and was sentenced to a total of
thirty to ninety years in prison.' In cases of what would involve felonies
if committed by adults, the District's juvenile act permitted the juvenile
court, after "full investigation!" to waive its "exclusive jurisdiction!"
with respect to children aged sixteen and seventeen. Kent was represented
by counsel who, when informed of the possibility of waiver, requested a
hearing on that issue. Counsel requested also that he be given access to
his client's social service file on the ground that the information therein
would have considerable bearing on the juvenile judge's decision whether
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. 387 U.S.1 (1967).
4. The phrase is Professor Paulsen's. The mixed metaphor is mine. Paulsen,
Kent v. United States: Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167.
5. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
6. Most of the commentary following Kent and preceding Gault was concerned
with the anticipated extension of constitutional guarantees to juvenile delinquency
adjudications. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 4; Comment, Criminal Offenders in the
Juvenile Courts: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171 (1966).
7. 383 U.S. at 550. Kent was found not guilty by reason of insanity with respect
to the rape charges. 383 U.S. at 550 n.10.
S. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961), now D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp.
IV, 1965).
9. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11.907 (1961), now D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1531 (Supp. IV,
1965).
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to retain or relinquish jurisdiction."0 The judge, without ruling on the
motions and without notifying Kent, his parents, or his lawyer, entered an
order reciting that "after full investigation, I do hereby waive" juris-
ciction." The case then embarked upon a torturous voyage, 2 which
five years later landed at the United States Supreme Court." The Court
held that "read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due
process and the assistance of counsel,"' 4 the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act did not permit the "critically important"'" waiver decision
to be made (1) without hearing; (2) without effective assistance of
counsel; (3) that effective assistance of counsel required that counsel
be given access to the child's social service file; and (4) that for purposes
of review, any waiver order must be accompanied by statement of reasons
for that decision considerably more enlightening than the recitation of
"full investigation."16 Implicit in the express holding of the Court is the
requirement that the child, and probably his parents, must be given
adequate notice of any hearing that is to be held to determine whether the
juvenile court will retain jurisdiction.
As is always the case with ground-breaking decisions, Kent raises a
formidable array of collateral problems within and without the juvenile
court system.' This article will be concerned with the problems clustered
about the narrow issue of waiver; specifically: does Kent, especially when
read in light of Gault, establish constitutional requirements for waiver
proceedings ?"s In what ways may juvenile courts divest themselves, or
be divested, of jurisdiction over children accused of serious offenses?
What is the rationale behind provisions permitting waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction? What criteria are judges to apply when making the
decision whether or not to waive? What is the effect on subesquent
proceedings of an error in the waiver proceeding? If Kent is a con-
situtional decision, is it retroactive?
10. Attached to counsel's motion was an affidavit signed by a psychiatrist which
described Kent as a victim of severe psychopathy and recommended hospitalization
for psychiatric evaluation. 383 U.S. at 545.
11. Id. at 546.
12. For a concise description of the intervening litigation see Comment, supra
note 6, at 1172-74.
13. This was not, however, the end of Kent's journey. See 383 U.S. at 564.
14. Id. at 557.
15. The phrase is rfom Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
and was declared by the Court to be the basis of its holding on the right to counsel issue.
383 U.S. at 558, 560.
16. 383 U.S. at 554, 557.
17. See Paulsen, supra note 4.
18. The various state statutes allowing for procedure similar to those considered
in Kent employ descriptive terms such as "certification," "transfer," as well as "waiver."
For the sake of uniformity the term "waiver will be used throughout this paper.
THE WAIVER OF JURISDICTION
II. Is KENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION?
After a careful reading of Kent and Gault, a question as to the
constitutional status of the holdings in the former case would seem pure
rhetoric. But there are those who remain unconvinced. Faced with the
argument that Kent, or Kent and Gault read together, required appoint-
ment of counsel for an indigent juvenile who was "certified" by the
juvenile court to the criminal court where he received a two-to-ten year
sentence for aggravated battery, the Supreme Court of New Mexico ruled
that "all that was accomplished by the certification proceeding was to
transfer jurisdiction over the defendant from the juvenile court to the
district court."'" Therefore, the "certification" was not a critical stage of
the criminal proceedings which would require the appointment of counsel.
Kent was distinguished on the grounds that Kent had counsel and that
the case applied only to the District of Columbia."0 Gault was declared
inapplicable because the constitutional guarantees required by that deci-
sion, including the right to appointed counsel, applied only "in proceedings
for the purpose of determining delinquency, which might result in com-
mitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed."'2'
New Mexico appears to be joined in this interpretation by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia" and the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals." However, in each of the latter cases the courts recognized
that their interpretations of Kent and Gault could be erroneous, and
based their holdings on the non-retroactivity of those decisions.' The
weight of authority, 2 as well as the plain language of Kent and Gault,
19. State v. Acuna, 428 P.2d 658, 659 (N.M. 1967). See also Salazar v. Roderi-
guez, 371 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1967) ; Jackson v. Johnson, 364 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1966).
20. State v. Acuna, 428 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M. 1967).
21. 428 P.2d at 661.
22. Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967) (petitioner was afforded
a hearing prior to waiver, but was not provided with counsel). But see Peyton v. French,
207 Va. 73, 79, 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966), where the same court, citing Kent, held:
[t]he action of the juvenile court judge in dealing with the petitioner in his
absence without a hearing and without notice to his parents, and the failure of
the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent petitioner's interest,
violated the mandatory provisions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court Law and the requirements of due process, and was a denial of petitioner's
constitutional guarantees under § 8 of the Constitution of Virginia.
23. State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162, 233 A.2d 326 (1967) (post-conviction relief
sought by prisoner convicted of robbery at age fifteen and who was not afforded an
opportunity to be represented by counsel at the time his case was waived from juvenile
court). "While Gault is clearly a constitutional decision, it is limited to proceedings
which determine juvenile delinquency, and it is unclear whether Kent and Gault together
establish constitutional principles applicable to waiver of jurisdiction proceedings." Id.
at - , 233 A.2d at 329. See also Hammer v. State, 2 CRim. L. REPTR. 2390 (Md.
App. Feb. 7, 1968) (BNA). cf. Shannon v. Gladden, 243 Ore. 334, 413 P.2d 418 (1966).
24. Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, - , 156 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1967) ; State v.
Hance, 2 Md. App. 162, , 233 A.2d 326, 329 (1967).
25. Brown v. New Jersey, 35 U.S.L.W. 2553 (D.N.J. March 9, 1967); Madera v.
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would indicate the need for such hedging.
The following language from the Kent opinion does seem to support
the argument that the Court was merely construing a statute:
[t]he Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
provide an adequate basis for decision in this case, and we go
no further.2"
Read in context, however, this statement appears in reply to the urgings
of amicus curiae that the Court seize the opportunity presented by Kent
to articulate constitutional standards applicable to juvenile delinquency
proceedings generallyY
The specific references to procedural regularity with respect to
waiver bristle with constitutional indicia. For example, the Court express-
ed its agreement with Black v. United States,28 that the waiver of
jurisdiction was a " 'critically important' action determining vitally
important statutory rights of the juvenile." 9 In effect, waiver is a judi-
cial determination that the child is beyond the rehabilitative philosophy
of the juvenile court "and is 'critically important' for the child who may
be abandoned as 'incorrigible' and for the society which has thus aban-
doned the child."3 There is convincing evidence that most juvenile
court personnel, and the judges themselves, regard the waiver of juris-
diction as the most severe sanction that may be imposed by the juvenile
court.3 ' Not only is the juvenile exposed to the probability of severe
punishment," but the confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile
Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Harris, 64 Cal. Reptr.
319, 434 P.2d 615 (1967); Steinhaur v. Florida, 2 Crim. L. Rep. 2331, Dec. 12, 1967;
Summers v. State, - Ind.- , 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967) ; State ex rel. Londerholm
v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966) ; Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256
(Ky. 1967) ; State v. Yoss, 10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 225 N.E.2d 275 (1967) ; Dillenburg v.
Maxwell, 70 Wash. 2d 325, 422 P.2d 783 (1967); cf. Knott v. Langlois, - R.I.
- , 231 A.2d 767 (1967); Paquette v. Langlois, - R.I.-, 219 A.2d 569
(1966). And see State v. Naylor, - Del. - , - , 207 A.2d 1, 11 (1965),
anticipating both Kent and Gault by ruling that unless the child is provided with counsel
at the waiver hearing he is denied due process of law. Texas has responded by statute.
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 2338-1 (Supp. 1967).
26. 383 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
29. 383 U.S. at 556, 560.
30. Watldns v. United States, 343 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
31. Malloy, Juvenile Court-A Labayrinth of Confusion for the Lawyer, 4 ARiz. L.
Rv. 1, 16-17 (1962); Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 173, 176 (1967); PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENiLE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 24 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRcF REPORT.]
32. The decision to waive will ordinarily include a determination that probation
in the particular case is not feasible. Kent, for example, faced a possible death penalty
for rape.
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proceeding is replaced by the publicity and the normative concepts of
penal law ;" the child acquires a public arrest record which, even if he is
acquitted, will inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobrium attach-
ed thereto by prospective employers;34 if convicted as an adult, the child
may be detained well past his twenty-first birthday; he may lose certain
civil rights and be disqualified for public employment.8" Moreover, if sent
to a typical adult prison, he is likely to be subjected to physical, and even
sexual, abuse by older inmates, and his chances for rehabilitation are
likely to decrease significantly.
The statutory scheme permitting waivers "assumes procedural regu-
larity sufficient... to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and
fairness [and] does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for
arbitrary procedure.""0
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a
result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without
a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of
justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue,
would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if
society's special concern for children, as reflected in the District
of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure.
We hold that it does not.87
Since these conclusions were reached upon a reading of the statute "in
the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the
assistance of counsel,"38 it is hardly conceivable that a state statute
permitting a similar disposition of a child by a juvenile court having
"exclusive jurisdiction" would pass constitutional muster in the absence
of the minimum procedural requirements listed in Kent."
In support of the position taken by the courts in New Mexico,
Maryland, and Virginia is the fact that Kent did have counsel, and that
the Supreme Court did not actually hold that counsel must be provided
33. See generally, Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoD. 401 (1958).
34. Of course, a juvenile "record" is not without its disadvantages and appears
not to be entirely "confidential." TASK FORCE REPORT 38-39.
35. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-67 (1966). On the collateral conse-
quences of a criminal conviction, see PRESIDENT'S COmmSSION Ox LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINSmTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: COmECTIONS 88-92
(1967).
36. 383 U.S. at 553.
37. Id. at 554.
38. Id. at 557.
39. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutimal Context of luvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 178-79.
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for all indigent juveniles subject to waiver. But it came close. After all,
the waiver proceeding is "critically important" and
[t]he right to representation by counsel is not a formality.
It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is
of the essence of justice. Appointment of counsel without
affording an opportunity for hearing on a "critically important"
decision is tantamoumt to denial of counsel.40
The references to Kent in the later Gault decision which, of course,
established the right to appointed counsel in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings if confinement is a possibility,4 would appear to settle the issue:
[j]ust as in Kent v. United States ... we indicated...
that the assistance of counsel is essential for purposes of waiver
proceedings so we hold now that it is equally essential for the
determination of delinquency carrying with it the awesome pro-
pect of incarceration in a state institution until the juvenile
reaches the age of 21.42
To now discount Kent because it dealt only with a narrow issue of
statutory interpretation, and then to distinguish Gault on the right to
counsel issue because waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction does not
result in "confinement" but in transfer to another court," reaches a new
apogee of judicial sophistry.
The waiver proceedings under consideration in Kent were, if any-
thing, considered by the Court to be more important, and more demand-
ing of the "guiding hand of counsel," because of the consequences of the
waiver decision.44 It is, in essence, a sentence of "death" as a juvenile,
with the subsequent proceedings in the criminal court completing the
execution.
III. WAIVER PROCEEDINGS IN INDIANA
Kent had no immediate impact upon Indiana juvenile courts if the
case of State v. Grubb4" can be taken as illustrative. Three juveniles, two
40. 383 U.s. at 561.
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
42. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The other references to Kent, 387 U.S. at 12, 30,
57, 58 seem to indicate an assumption that the right to counsel at waiver hearings was
so clear as to require no further discussion.
43. 428 P.2d 658, 659 (1967).
44. In Kent, the Court quoted with approval the holding of the Court of Appeals
in Black v. United States that "[tihe need is even greater in the adjudication of waiver
[than in juvenile delinquency hearings] since it contemplates the imposition of criminal
sanctions." 383 U.S. at 558, quoting 355 F.2d 104, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
45. Cause No. C67-$115, (Monroe Co. Cir. Ct Ind., May 17, 1967). Consider also
the following quotation from 17 Juv. CT. JUDGEs J. 98 (1966) :
[t]he famous Kent case has focused interest on the problems involved
when the juvenile court gives up and releases a child for criminal prosecution.
588
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aged seventeen years and the other aged sixteen years, were arrested on
April 20 and 21, 1967. They were charged with an attempt to pass
forged checks,46 and were lodged in the juvenile wing of the county jail.
Indiana law with respect to waiver is similar to that of the District of
Columbia. The Juvenile Court Act provides that the juvenile court shall
have "original exclusive jurisdiction, except when specifically waived by
the Court, . .. in all cases of delinquent . . .children. . . " In cases
involving children aged fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen years "charged
with an offense which would amount to a crime if committed by an
adult" the juvenile court judge "after full investigation may waive
jurisdiction" and order the minor held for criminal prosecution.48
On April 24, 1967, petitions to determine the delinquency of the
three juveniles were filed by the chief probation officer. On the same day
the juvenile court judge, in each case, signed printed forms titled
"Waiver of Jurisdiction." The "boilerplate" recited that after "full
investigation" the court "has found . .. that it should waive its juris-
diction" over the child, and that the child should be held for criminal
prosecution." The record discloses no notice given to the juveniles that a
waiver was contemplated; they were not informed of any right to counsel;
no hearing was held; and no reasons for the waiver decision were given.
Perhaps due to the informal nature of the waiver decision, the prosecutor
did not file affidavits in circuit court until May 17, 1967, twenty-seven
days after entry of the waiver order, and two days after the Supreme
Court's Gault decision."0 The charges were conspiracy to commit a
Essentially, however, the viatter is of minor importance in the juvenile court
field. Granted that it often is a matter of life and death in a particular case,
the unhappy fact remains that matters of life and death are almost daily occur-
rences even in relatively small juvenile courts, while waivers are infrequent.
(emphasis added.)
The fact that, statistically, the number of instances in which a juvenile court purposely
gives up its jurisdiction may be small, hardly justifies such an attitude toward an
important decision which, if made in favor of waiver, rejects the very raison d'etre of
the juvenile court.
46. The check blanks were alleged to have been the fruits of a burglary of a
filling station which took place on the evening of April 19, 1967.
47. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3103 (Burns 1956 Repl.). "The word 'delinquent child'
shall include any boy under the full age of eighteen (18) years .. who: (1) Commits an
act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life
imprisonment...." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204 (Burns Supp. 1966).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3214 (Burns Supp. 1966) Monroe County has no
separate juvenile court. The circuit judge sits as juvenile court judge. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-3102 (Bums Supp. 1966).
49. The court did have access to certain background information concerning two
of the juveniles. However, as to the third, no information was available since the boy
had only recently come to Indiana from another state. It appears that no attempt was
made to obtain a complete social history of this person.
50. During this time, the defendants were held in jail, apparently without bond,
and without having been advised of their right to counsel. After arraignment they were
released on their own recognizance pending sentence.
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felony and second degree burglary. The defendants were arraigned
immediately, waived counsel, and each pleaded guilty to a single felony
(two pleaded guilty to the charge of burglary, and one to conspiracy).
At the time scheduled for sentencing, a representative of the local
chapter of the ACLU appeared as amicus curiae, arguing that Kent and
Gault required that the guilty pleas be vacated and the matter be remanded
to juvenile court for compliance with the procedural requirements estab-
lished by those cases. The court took the matter under advisement and
later appointed counsel for each defendant to aid them in seeking
appropriate relief. 1 Since that time waiver hearings, with appointed
counsel where necessary, have become the practice in this county. The
practice was established prior to the ruling in Summers v. State, 2
which held that the procedural safeguards prescribed by Kent were
mandatory for all Indiana juvenile courts.
Summers was one of three recent cases in which the Indiana Supreme
Court has, sua sponte, raised the question of improper waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction.5" In each case, criminal convictions were vacated on
the ground that defective waiver of jurisdiction deprives the criminal
court of subject-matter jurisdiction." In none of these cases had any
officer of the juvenile court taken the first step necessary for acquisition of
51. Conversations with the juvenile court judge and the chief probation officer
revealed that their actions with respect to the waiver of these juveniles were influenced
by a communication from the State Department of Correction requesting that older
teenagers not be sent to the Indiana Boy's School because of lack of adequate facilities.
Therefore, if probation was not indicated in a particular case, waiver appeared to be the
only feasible alternative. The current head of the Department of Correction has informed
the writer that such a directive is no longer in force.
52. - Ind. - , 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
53. The other cases are Hicks v. State, 230 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 1967); Edwards v.
State, 231 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. 1967).
54. Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 1967); Hicks v. State, 230
N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. 1967) ; Edwards v. State, 231 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Ind. 1967).
Hicks raised the question of proper waiver procedures in counties in which there
is no separate juvenile court:
[w]e feel that the only reasonable construction of [the relevant portions
of the juvenile procedure statutes] requires that, in a county not having a
separate juvenile court, the circuit court must sit in its capacity as a
juvenile court in initially accepting jurisdiction of an alleged juvenile offender.
In a case where it is not apparent at the outset of a prosecution that the
defendant is below the full age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
alleged offense, upon receiving an indication of such fact the court shall
halt the proceedings and transfer the case to its juvenile docket . . . and the
matter should thereafter be treated in every respect in accordance with this
state's juvenile procedure statutes.
The clear import of this holding is that in counties where there is no
separate juvenile court, the circuit court must treat the matter of juvenile
offenses as if it were two (2) separate courts-juvenile and criminal-and
that such court may only place alleged juvenile offenses on its criminal
docket after waiver proceedings in accordance with the juvenile procedure
statutes and the ruling . . . in Summers v. State.... Hicks v. State, supra
at 761.
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juvenile court jurisdiction, i.e., the filing of a petition to determine the
delinquency of the juvenile." Although not clearly articulated in any, the
three cases, read together, seem to establish that a failure to conduct a pro-
per waiver hearing, the failure to provide the juvenile with an opport-
unity to be represented by counsel, or the failure to accompany the waiver
order with a statement of reason sufficient to permit a meaningful review,
also would prevent the criminal court from acquiring jurisdiction."
Summers falls short of Kent, however, since there is no requirement
that counsel be given access to the child's social history records before or
during the waiver hearing. The omission was perhaps inadvertent, but
even if it was intentional, the reasoning in Kent that "if a decision on
waiver is 'critically important' . . . the material submitted to the judge...
[must] be subjected, within reasonable limits... to examination, criticism
and refutation,""7 indicates that access to such records is a part of the
due process package.
But Summers goes beyond Kent in several important respects. The
United States Supreme Court did not rule that the erroneous waiver
order deprived the district court of jurisdiction." Summers specifies
that at the waiver hearing the juvenile shall have "the right to con-
frontation of witnesses against him; the right to present evidence ... of
any circumstances that would entitle him to the benefits that might be
afforded to him by the provisions of the Juvenile Act."" Kent disclaimed
any attempt to set specific requirements for hearing beyond the require-
ment that it "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment."" 9 Summers, on the other hand, suggests criteria to be applied
by the juvenile court in reaching a waiver decision.6' Finally, Summers
held that a prosecuting attorney may petition the juvenile court for waiver
of jurisdiction in a case where he believes "a juvenile offense in a
55. ID. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3207 9-3208 (Burns Supp. 1966). See Summers v. State,
230 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 1967).
56. Id. "Statutory requirements have been held to be jurisdictional for more than
one hundred years in Indiana." The court also observed in Sumiters "that it is only
after . . .hearing that a transfer to the Lake Criminal Court may be lawfully made."
--. Ind. at - , 230 N.E.2d at 325. Cf. Hicks v. State, 230 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Ind.
1967), describing Summers as holding "that before a criminal court could obtain
jurisdiction of such offender." (Emphasis added.) Edward v. State, 231 N.E.2d 20,
if committed by an adult, the juvenile court must properly waive its own exclusive
jurisdiction of such offender." (emphasis added). Edwards v. State, 231 N.E.2d 20,
21 (Ind. 1967).
57. 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1967).
58. The jurisdictional point was argued on behalf of Kent, but ignored by the Court.
59. 230 N.E.2d at 325.
60. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1967). The Court added an appendix
listing criteria suggested by the judge of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia,
id. at 565-68, but gave no indication of its views as to the propriety of these criteria.
61. 230 N.E.2d at 325-26.
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particular instance has specific prosecutive merit." 2 This adds a proce-
dure not authoriezed by the Juvenile Court Act. It is hoped that, if valid,
such power will be exercised circumspectly to prevent waiver proceedings
from taking on the appearance of a tug-of-war between the prosecutor
and the defense attorney, with the child in the middle, and the juvenile
court judge standing by as referee.
There is an additional problem in states like Indiana where the
juvenile court judge sits also as the judge of the court of general juris-
diction. If such a judge conducts the waiver hearing, he will have com-
pletely familiarized himself with the past record of the accused. This
would seem to disqualify him from sitting either as judge in the juvenile
delinquency proceeding if jurisdiction is retained, or as judge in the
criminal trial if jurisdiction is waived.
IV. THE RATIONALE OF WAIVER
A. Persons Subject to Waiver
The waiver decision affects only those minors who have committed
acts which, if committed by a person over the maximum age for original
juvenile court jurisdiction (usually eighteen), would be criminal. Al-
though the statutes of the various states vary with respect to age and
category of offense, it is usually the older teenager charged with a serious
crime who will be the subject of a waiver decision. In the 1965 crime
reports, analyzed by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, the fifteen to seventeen year-old-age
group (the most vulnerable to waiver) emerged as a significant statistical
category. 3 The arrest rate for this group for the most serious offenses
(wilfull homicide, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) was
62. 230 N.E.2d at 326.
63. PRESIDENT'S COMAIISSON ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINiSTRATION OF
JusTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967). Indeed, the fifteen
to seventeen age grouping reflects the highest overall arrest record. The rate for 1965
was 8,050 per 100,000 population, compared with the next highest rate of 7,539.6
arrests per 100,000 population for the eighteen to twenty age group. The eleven to
fourteen year old group showed a rate of 3,064.4 arrests per 100,000 population.
Id. 56, Table 1.
The Report qualifies these figures in recognizing that the juvenile contribution to
the overall crime problem might be distorted if the figures are used as the only guide.
First, juveniles are more easily apprehended than adults. Second, the more pronounced
tendency of juveniles to act in groups when committing crimes may produce numbers of
arrests significantly in excess of the crimes actually committed. Third, juveniles are
most frequently arrested for petty larceny, fighting, disorderly conduct, liquor-related
offenses, and conduct not in violation of the criminal law such as curfew violation,
truancy, incorrigibility, or running away from home. Id. 56. However, insofar as the
figures reflect arrests for the more serious crimes, they reveal a large number of persons
potentially subject to a waiver decision.
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222.8 per 100,000 population, or fourth highest for all age groupings."'
As to the -serious property crimes, including burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft, the fifteen to seventeen year-old-age group compiled an
arrest rate of almost twice that of any other age grouping. 5
Also, the relinquishment of juvenile court jurisdiction may seriously
be contemplated only with respect to those who previously have been
before the juvenile court and who have demonstrated a tendency to
recidivate. These persons will have filtered through the informal screen-
ing process designed to separate most cases for disposition at the pre-
judicial stage. 6 However, this informal process can hardly be depended
upon to isolate every person for whom the individualized, rehabilitative
methods of the juvenile justice system are still relevant. The juvenile
court judge must exercise great care to make sure that community
indignation directed at a particular offense or offender, or loose procedures
based upon presumed good faith of the juvenile system personnel, do not
replace a very deliberate evaluation of the individual case.
At the judicial stage, whether the decision is made to waive or retain
jurisdiction, the juvenile court is acting as a court of last resort. The
decisions in cases like Kent and Gault which have infused procedural
regularity into juvenile proceedings are, in effect, recognitions of reality:
[t]he juvenile court is a court of law, charged like other
agencies of criminal justice with protecting the community
against threatening conduct. Rehabilitation of offenders through
individualized handling is one way of providing protection,
and appropriately the primary way in dealing with children.
But the guiding consideration for a court of law that deals with
the threatening conduct is nevertheless protection of the com-
munity. The juvenile court, like other courts, is therefore
64. The eighteen to twenty age group reflected the highest arrest rate for these
crimes (299.8 per 100,000 population). The twenty-one to twenty-four group was second
(296.6 per 100,000), and the twenty-five to twenty-nine age group was third (233.6 per
100,000). Id.
65. Id. The rate was 2,467 arrests per 100,000 population, compared with the next
highest rate of 1,452 arrests per 100,000 pouplation in the eighteen to twenty age group.
The Report notes a significant increase in criminal-type juvenile delinquency in
recent years:
[bletween 1960 and 1965, arrests of persons under 18 years of age jumped
52 percent for wilful homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny,
burglary and motor vehicle theft. During the same period arrests of persons
18 and over for these offenses rose only 20 percent. This is explained in
large part by the disproportionate increase in the population under 18 and in
particular, the crime-prone part of that population--the 11 to 17 year old
age group.
Id.
66. The process is described in TAsK FORCE REPORT 11-22. See also, Terry, The
Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. Cvam. L.C. & P.S. 173 (1967).
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obliged to employ all the means at hand, not excluding incap-
acitation, for achieving that protection. What should distinguish
the juvenile from the criminal courts is their greater emphasis
on rehabilitation, not their exclusive preocucpation with it."7
Since in those cases in which waiver is contemplated some type of
confinement is foreseen if the accused's guilt is established, the choice is
between a juvenile institution and some type of adult correctional
facility. Although, practically speaking, there may be no great difference
in the administration of either institution," the decision to waive
carries with it significant consequences beyond the type of institution in
which the youth is to be confined.69
Compounding the waiver problem is the fact that, beyond the juv-
enile system, a great majority of the states make no special provision for
young offenders."0 The waiver decision must be made with the realization
that the youth will, in all likelihood, be sent to an adult prison where no
special rehabilitative and guidance programs will be available. Even if the
youth is treated leniently by the trial court as a first (adult) offender, '
his conviction record is indelible. A young man between fifteen and
twenty-five years of age is still too young for the human trash pile to
which "ex-cons" are too often relegated.
In the federal system, Congress has sought to meet this problem
through the Youth Corrections Act."2 The statute gives federal judges
discretion to commit convicted federal offenders below the age of twenty-
two to the custody of the Attorney General for special treatment as youth
offenders. In such cases, no matter what penalty is contemplated by the
criminal statute which has been violated, the Youth Corrections Act
requires conditional release within four years of the date of conviction,
and unconditional discharge no later than six years from date of con-
viction. The maximum period may be extended at the time of initial
sentence in cases where the judge determines that additional treatment
and supervision may be required. 3 The Act contemplates individual
classification of youth offenders and segregation of these offenders in
facilities specially equipped to provide "treatment" which is defined as
67. CHALLENGE, supra note 63.
68. See Allen, Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRns. L. C.
& P.S. 226, 227 (1959).
69. See text accompanying notes 30-35, supra.
70. Luger, The Youthful Offender, TASK FORCE REPORT (Appendix G) 119, 121.
Also see NATIONAL CoUNcI. ON CRimE & DEL NgQuEcY, NATIONAL SURVEY ON
YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (Feb. 1966).
71. See Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE
REPoRT (Appendix D) 91, 101.
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1964).
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010, 5017(c) (1964).
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"corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the
public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth of fenders." '
In addition to these special considerations, the Act provides that upon his
unconditional discharge by the Youth Correction Division, the youth
offender's criminal conviction is automatically set aside and he is to be
issued a certificate to that effect."5 Similar discretionary provisions with
respect to young adult offenders between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
two are proposed by the American Law Institute.8
It is obvious that classifications with respect to age are arbitrary,
and arguments can be made to extend such treatment to persons aged
twenty-five or thirty or, for that matter, any age. However, the most
recent statistical analysis indicates that sixteen to twenty-three year-olds
are a significant group with respect to felony arrests.7 " Also, a study of
1,000 federal prisoners revealed a pronounced negative correlation be-
tween youth at the time of initial arrest and rate of recidivism, with a
significant proportion of the recidivists within the sixteen to twenty-
three year age grouping.78 The experts reporting to the President's
Commission concluded that specialized treatment for young offenders
beyond juvenile court age, or within the waiver range, would be in the
best interests of society as well as of the offender."
One cannot be very optimistic about the success of youth offender
programs in jurisdictions which have been unable or unwilling to provide
even the minimum correctional facilities and personnel for juveniles.
However, insofar as the youthful offender acts call for vacation of con-
74. 18 U.S.C. § 5006(g) (1964).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1964). But the Act provides a double-edged sword, per-
mitting longer confinement for persons subject to the Act than does the statute they
are alleged to have violated. Cummingham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958).
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Provisions are
made for a maximum term of four years, and the sentencing alternative may be
utilized regardless of the degree of felony involved.
77. Luger, supra note 70, at 120.
In 1964, this age group was responsible for 27 percent of total arrests in
the United States. . . .These youths accounted for 26 percent of all murder
and non-neglient manslaughter, 34 percent of all robbery, 29 percent of all
aggravated assault, 44 percent of burglary, breaking and entering, 36 percent
of all larceny, and 53 percent of all auto thefts.
78. Id. at 120-21 citing D. GLASER, THE EFFECrIVENESS OF A PRISON AND
PAROLE SysTEm (1964).
79. Luger, supra note 70 at 121:
There is no reason to expect automatic insensitive handling of young offenders
because of specialized laws and programs, as long as alternatives and varied
resources are at the authorities' disposal. There is much more risk in attempting
to deal with this population without taking cognizance of the differentiating
pressures, problems, and potential of young offenders. Personnel specifically
prepared and knowledgeable about this group are required. Special measures
need to be incorporated, in keeping with the individuality of treatment and
emphasis on rehabilitation that are traditionally the cornerstones of our
efforts with young offenders.
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victions (or, better yet, expungment of all records with respect to the
offense), they will aid the resocialization of the offender who, hopefully,
will have been subjected to some rehabilitative efforts during the period
of his confinement.
B. Forms of Waiver
The statutes of the several states reflect a wide range of judgments
with respect to the persons who will be afforded the special considerations
of the juvenile justice system. For purposes of this discussion these
judgments are treated as waiver decisions, and are classified as follows:
(1) legislative waiver; (2) judicial waiver; (3) prosecutor's choice;
and (4) waiver-Texas style.
1. Legislative Waiver
All juvenile acts set a maximum age, usually between sixteen and
twenty-one, beyond which juvenile court jurisdiction does not extend.
This, of course, represents a deliberate legislative choice with respect to
those young persons who are, in all cases, to be treated as adult criminals.
In addition, many states provide that, regardless of age, juvenile courts
shall have no jurisdiction over very serious forms of criminal conduct
calling for penalties of death or life imprisonment."0 Other states pre-
scribe a minimum age at which the criminal court shall have jurisdiction
of a capital or other serious offense, with all other offenses remaining
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.8 Even in those jurisdictions where
juvenile treatment for serious crimes is excluded, criminal prosecutions
will be barred with respect to children presumed too young to be capable
of crime." Also, new concepts of "cruel and unusual punishment"
emanating from the now famous case of Robinson v. California,"
would appear to have a limiting effect upon a state's ability to punish
children in the pre-low-teen age range in spite of any finding of capacity.
80. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204 (1) (Burns Supp. 1966).
81. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13: 1570A(5) (1968), excluding juvenile courtjurisdiction over a child fifteen years of age or older chraged with a capital offense,
or assault with intent to commit rape. Montana provides for criminal jurisdiction for
children over sixteen charged with murder, manslaughter, rape or attemped rape
aggravated assault, robbery, burglary while possessing a deadly weapon, arson, and
carrying a deadly weapon with intent to assault. For other offenses juvenile courtjurisdiction extends to age eighteen. MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 10-602 (Supp. 1967).
82. The common law rule is that children below the age of seven are incapable of
committing crimes, and between the ages of seven and fourteen there is a rebuttable
presumption of incapacity. The age of absloute incapacity has been raised above seven in
several jurisdictions. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 4.10, Comment at 14-15 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1957). See State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954).
83. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions ont
the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiouswss, Crimes of
Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRum. L. BuLL. 205, 236 (1967).
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The exclusion of even the most serious crimes seems incompatible
with the avowed rehabilitative aims of the juvenile court system.8
The serious offenses withheld legislatively from the juvenile court are
those for which public demand for punishment will be greatest. But the
argument that the demand for public airing of such offenses will be
tempered by lenient treatment of the very young" is not very comforting.
Neither should the argument that the retention of juvenile jurisdiction
over these offenses will invoke the hostility of those howling for venge-
ance8 deter a humanitarian approach. A set of properly formulated
waiver procedures will provide the necessary safeguards, both for the
public and for the juvenile.
2. Judicial Waiver
In the great majority of states, juvenile courts are vested with
exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles up to a stated age, but with power to
divest themselves of jurisdiction within certain age ranges. The waiver of
jurisdiction is sometimes permitted only with respect to felonies, but in
many jurisdictions it is permitted for any criminal offense. Many states
permit waiver at any age;"t others permit waiver from the specific ages
twelve,8 thirteen," fourteen," fifteen91 and sixteen.92
Modern recommendations for juvenile courts suggest exclusive juris-
diction for all offenses committed by children under the age of sixteen,
with waiver of jurisdiction ailowed for sixteen and seventeen year olds
whose offenses would amount to felonies if committed by adults (adults
84. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 82, at 17. See also Comment, Criminal Offenders
in Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1209(1966) ; State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954).
85. See Lemert, supra note 71, at 100.
86. TASK FORCE REPORT 24.
87. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California (but see discussion of conflicting
provisions of California law on this point in Comment, supra note 84, at 1207),
Kentucky (felony only), Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire (felony only),
Ohio (felony only), Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington. But see
notes 82, 83, supra and accompanying text.
88. Minnesota.
89. Mississippi (felony only).
90. Alabama, Florida (felony only), Hawaii (felony only), Massachusetts, New
Mexico (felony only), North Carolina (felony for which penalty is not more than ten
years in prsion-other felonies with greater punishments subject to criminal prosecution
in first instance), North Dakota, Pennsylvania (offense punishable by imprisonment in a
state penitentiary), Utah, Virginia.
91. Georgia (but see Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730, 101 S.E.2d 621 (1957),
interpreting statute in light of state constitution and finding concurrent jurisdiction in
criminal court), Indiana, Michigan (felony only), Texas (felony only).
92. Delaware, Distirct of Columbia (felony only), Idaho (felony only), Kansas(felony only), Nevada (felony only), New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee(felony only), Wisconsin.
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being defined as persons eighteen years of age and over)." These
suggestions are defensible so long as proper procedural safeguards are
observed, and appropriate criteria are applied in reaching the waiver
decision." In addition, however, special sentencing provisions should
be made for youthful offenders falling outside the ambit of juvenile
court jurisdiction.
In some states criminal courts may be given original jurisdiction over
older teenagers accused of crime, but with the option of sending the case
to juvenile court for disposition.95 Although the Kent holding does not
extend to such a procedure, it would seem that in any case where an
offender might be eligible for juvenile court treatment, the court should
hold a hearing to determine whether the retention of criminal court
jurisdiction is warranted.9"
3. Prosecutor's Choice
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act contains a unique waiver provision
which allows the prosecutor to determine in which court a minor over
the age of thirteen years is to be charged. If a juvenile judge objects to
the removal of a case from his jurisdiction, the chief judge of the circuit
must decide in which court the juvenile is to be tried."7 A recent Iowa
case9" held the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the criminal court
to be concurrent. Therefore, whether the juvenile court or the criminal
court acquires jurisdiction of a child under eighteen depends upon the
prosecutor's choice of forum.
These approaches to waiver are of doubtful validity in light of the
controls which the Supreme Court, through Kent, has placed upon a
93. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 410 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); HEW,
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 34-35 (1966) ; TASK ForCE REPORT 25.
94. See text accompanying notes 117-128, .rupra.
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 363 (1958), permitting transfer to juvenile court
of sixteen and seventeen year olds if the criminal court deems "it to be in the interest
of justice or the public welfare...."
96. But see text at note 100, infra.
97. Smith-Hurd, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Supp. 1965). Compare the
following provision of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act which covers persons
under eighteen years of age:
[a] juvenile alleged to have committed one or more acts in violation of a law of
the United States not punishable by death or life imprisonment, and not sur-
rendered to the authorities of a state, shall be proceeded against as a juvenile
delinquent if he consents to such procedure, unless the Attorney General, in his
discretion, has expressly directed otherwise.
In such event the juvenile shall be proceeded against by information and
no criminal prosecution shall be instituted for the alleged violation.
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1964). A three judge panel of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York has ruled the federal act unconstitutional insofar
as election to be treated as a juvenile under the act deprives the accused of trial by jury.
Nieves v. United States, 2 CRmar. L. RrTR. 2481 (1968).
98. State v. Stueve, 150 N.W.2d 597 (1967).
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juvenile judge's exercise of a similar discretionary power. It would
indeed be strange if this critically important decision can now be left
wholly to the prosecutor who cannot be expected to weigh objectively
the welfare of the child against the need to protect society from the child.
The possibilities for arbitrary and discriminatory choice allowed by this
method of waiver render it contrary to principles of equal protection as
well as due process of law.9"
Another objection to leaving the waiver decision to the prosecutor
is well stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Harrison v. United States:
[t]he question presented by the teenager accused of serious
crime is undoubtedly baffling, and there are no clear answers.
Particularly vexing are the problems presented by the sixteen
or seventeen year old adolescents precocious in criminal pro-
pensity. The problem of which of them should be waived is of
such breadth and complexity, that the responsibility for the
waiver determination was deliberately assigned to the judge of
the Juvenile Court and not to the prosecutorial arm of the
government. The "full investigation" by the judge specified in
the statute, is not confined to an awareness of the offense at
hand, but includes evaluation of the juvenile and his record,
made by the judge with the benefit of the contribution of
assistants with special background in the social sciences.' 0
Perhaps the requirements of Kent would be satisfied under the
Illinois and Iowa "prosecutor's choice" procedure, if the judge before
whom the case is brought for criminal trial trial were to ascertain
whether the defendant is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, and hold
a hearing to determine whether the case should be remanded to the
juvenile court or retained by the criminal court. However, this does not
meet the objection of Harrison that such a decision requires the expertise
of the juvenile judge. On the whole, the prosecutor's choice method of
waiver, even if reviewed by the trial court, is unsatisfactory and probably
unconstitutional.
4. Waiver-Texas Style.
Until the Texas legislature in 1967 passed a statute that may be
regarded as a model for compliance with Kent,"0' the Texas courts
99. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 83, at 229-32. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The
Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 182 n. 61.
100. 359 F.2d 214, 224-26 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also the remarks of Judge E.
Barrett Prettyman quoted 359 F.2d at 225 n.8.
101. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art 2338-1 (Supp. 1967). The statute permits waivers of
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
permitted what was perhaps the most transparent of all practices designed
to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction over children charged with serious
crimes. Under Texas law, adult jurisdiction for boys begins at age
seventeen."02 Interpreting prior law, the Texas courts held that age at
time of trial, and not at the time of the offense, determined whether a
person was subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. " Until 1965, Texas
juvenile courts had exclusive jurisdiction of boys under seventeen years
and girls under eighteen years; there was no provision for waiver.'
With respect to serious offenses, usually homicides, Texas prosecutors
developed the technique of waiting until the child passed juvenile court
age and then initiating proceedings in the criminal courts. This procedure
was recognized by the courts.' Also permitted was a practice whereby
the offender would be committed to juvenile custody on deliquency char-
ges, usually connected with the alleged offense, to await his seventeenth
birthday.' Only when the charge upon which the offender was com-
mitted to juvenile custody was the same as the one later relied upon for
criminal prosecution did the Texas courts react with a finding of a denial
of due process of law." 7
In 1965, the Texas legislature reacted by amending the juvenile
act to provide for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction with respect to a
child over sixteen years of age. Added to this was a provision obviously
aimed at the dilatory tactics described above: "and no child under sixteen
(16) years of age at the time of the offense is committed shall be
prosecuted as an adult at any later date unless transferred by the Juvenile
Court, and all such offenses committed by children not so transferred
juvenile court jurisdiction with respect to fifteen and sixteen-year-old children charged
with felonies. The law requires a hearing; appointment of counsel, if necessary; counsel
is to have access to all records pertaining to the child; the hearing must be preceded by
a complete diagnostic and social study of the child; evaluative criteria are specified; a
waiver order must be accompanied by a statement of findings.
102. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art 2338-1 (Supp. 1967) (18 for girls).
103. Foster v. State, 400 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crini. 1966). See generally, Comment,
Age and Related .uridictional Problerns of the Juvenile Courts, 36 TEX. L. Ray. 323
(1958). The question whether juvenile court jurisdiction is to be determined by age at
time of offense, or by age at the time of legal proceedings depends upon the manner in
which a court chooses to interpret the governing statute. The cases are collected in
Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 507 (1963). There is an excellent discussion of this problem in
MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments to § 4.10 at 6-21 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).
The 1967 amendment to the Texas Juvenile Act specifies that age at time of the
alleged offense is determinative of juvenile court jurisdiction. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
art 2338-1 (Supp. 1967).
104. See MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 103, at 12.
105. Peterson v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 105, 235 S.W.2d 138, cert. denied, 341 U.S.
932 (1950) ; Comment, supra note 103, at 332-33.
106. Foster v. State, 400 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. 1966).
107. Garza v. State, 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. 1963); Sawyer v. Hauk, 245
F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965).
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shall be subject to disposition by the Juvenile Court only." '  However,
this portion of the statute was declared to be in violation of the Texas
constitution in Foster v. State.' A fifteen-year-old boy was arrested in
1963 for the murder and robbery of an older man. Shortly thereafter he
was committed to a juvenile institution. His delinquency was determined
upon his having committed "theft from a person"-i.e., he took, the
murder victim's wallet."1 Two years later, having reached the age of
seventeen, he was returned to the criminal court, tried for murder and
given a life sentence. On appeal, the defendant argued that the 1965
amendment to the juvenile act barred his trial as an adult since he was
under sixteen years of age at the time the offense was committed. The
court held that the amendment relied upon by defendant was uncon-
stitutional because it "is so indefinitely framed and of such doubtful
construction that it cannot be understood. . . .""' As to the necessity for
transfer of jurisdiction, the court accepted the certification of the trial
judge that the juvenile court never assumed any jurisdiction for murder,
and, since the youth was then past seventeen years of age, juvenile court
jurisdiction was no longer possible." 2
The Texas court stuck to its guns even after Kent. In Ex parte
Miranda,"' two youths, aged fifteen and sixteen years, were arrested
for murder in December, 1965 (after the effective date of the statute
permitting waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction). They were committed
to a juvenile institution on charges unconnected with the alleged murder.
No mention of the murder charge appeared in the juvenile court record,
and no waiver determination regarding that charge was made with respect
to either youth. They were returned to the criminal court after each had
passed his seventeenth birthday. Application for writs of habeas corpus
were made on their behalf alleging that the state was in possession of
sufficient information to prosecute them for the murder at the time of the
original hearing in juvenile court, and that the state could then have
requested that they be waived to the adult court to stand trial for that
crime. Relying on Kent, they argued that they were deprived of a hearing
in juvenile court regarding the transfer of the murder case to criminal
court. On appeal from a denial of their petitions, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals found Kent could be "distinguished on the facts""' 4
but did not bother to explain how or why. The court held that the 1965
108. Texas Acts, 1965, ch. 577 at 1256.
109. 400 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. 1966).
110. Id. at 556.
111. Id. at 558.
112 Id.
113. 415 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Crim. 1967) (decided two days after Gault).
114. Id. at 415.
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amendment with respect to waiver proceedings in juvenile court was
merely permissive and did not require the juvenile court to determine
whether jurisdiction over the murder charges should be retained by the
juvenile court or waived. Since the youths had by now passed juvenile
court age, "waiver of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court no longer
applies." 11
5
Happily (or perhaps I should say hopefully), the Texas legislature
has put an end to this:
[i] f the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the child is not sub-
ject to prosecution at any time for any offense alleged in the
petition or for any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile
judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the proceeding."'
Since counsel is now required in all juvenile proceedings involving waiver
of jurisdiction or determinations of delinquency involving potential con-
finement, even Texas judges should no longer be able to claim ignorance
,of the true nature of the juvenile's offense.
C. Waiver Criteria
As already will have become apparent, waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction is a compromise of principle dictated by the unwillingness of
society to pay the price necessary to find out whether our theories of
justice for the juvenile are at all valid."' Waiver, therefore, remains an
unsatisfactory, but nevertheless practical, means of ridding the juvenile
court of persons whom it is not equipped to handle, and, more likely than
not, has mishandled in the first place. Secondly, as indicated by the
reported cases, waiver usually is "not a scientific evaluation of whether the
youth will respond successfully to a juvenile court disposition but a front
for society's insistence on retribution or social protection.""
Kent introduces procedural regularity, but gives no indication of the
Supreme Court's views regarding the propriety of waiver in particular
cases. The question is, of course, one of assessing the disadvantages of
waiver with respect to the child in light of the dispositional alternatives
available to the juvenile court, and the threat (present or future) to
society represented by the child. It is an unenviable task. Perhaps it is
true that the ability to sort out cases comes to a juvenile judge as the
115. Id. See Solis v. Texas, 418 S.W.2d 265 (Civ. App. 1967), for another prose-
cutor's ploy to preserve a murder case involving fifteen year old boys.
116. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art 2338-1 (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
117. Compare Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction, An Evaluation of the
Process in the Juvenile Court, 9 Cansz & DELINQUE-CY 121 (1963), with Advisory
Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Transfer of Cases
Between Juvenile and Oriminal Courts, 8 CumsE & DEiNQUENCY 3 (1962).
118. TASK FORCE PORT 24.
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result of his "experience gleaned from cases of thousands of delin-
quents,"11 but this "seaman's eye" approach is no longer acceptable
under the Kent standards. Judges must now give reasons for their waiver
decisions, and those reasons will be evaluated by other judges. Therefore,
we must try to identify acceptable waiver criteria. In so doing, we may
determine the content of the waiver hearing.
In a 1962 survey of fifty juvenile court judges, the following factors
were listed as influencing the waiver decision: (1) issues of contestable
fact which would prolong a juvenile hearing; (2) serious offense occurr-
ing after previous correctional treatment; (3) the case is hopeless; (4)
the child needs to be punished for his attitude; (5) the advantage in
resources for treatment and public safety lies with the criminal court
rather than the juvenile court."' All but the last of the listed criteria
were deemed by the evaluators to be in conflict with juvenile court
philosophyP'2  A more recent and wider survey conducted by the
Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice revealed more specific criteria. They are listed
below in order of reported frequency of use:
1. Seriousness of the alleged offense.
2. Record and history of the juvenile, including prior contacts
with police, court or other official agencies.
3. Aggressive, violent, premeditated, or wilfull manner by
which the offense was committed.
4. Sophistication, maturity, emotional attitude of the juvenile.
5. Proximity of juvenile's age to maximum age of juvenile
court jurisdiction.
6. More appropriate procedures, services, and facilities avail-
able in the adult court for the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation.
7. The possible need for a longer period of incarceration.
8. Evidence apparently sufficient for a grand jury indictment.
9. The juvenile's associates in the alleged offense will be
charged with a crime in an adult court.
10. Effect of judgment of waiver on public's respect for law
enforcement and law compliance.
11. Community attitude toward the specific offense. 2
119. Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214, 226 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
120. Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 117, at 5.
121. Id. at 5-7.
122. TAssK FoRcE REPoRT 78, Appendix B, Table 5. The sample included 207juvenile courts serving populations of 100,000 or over. Responses with respect to criteria
were received from 176 courts.
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In Summers v. State,2' the Indiana Supreme Court faced its
"responsibility to delineate guidelines for the juvenile courts re waiver
orders."' 24 An offense committed by a juvenile may be waived to a
criminal court if, among other unspecified things,
the offense has specific prosecutive merit in the opinion of the
prosecuting attorney; or it is heinous or of an aggravated
character, greater weight being given to offenses against the
person than to offenses against property; or, even though less
serious, if the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile
offenses which would lead to a determination that the said
juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under the regular statu-
tory juvenile procedures; or where it is found to be in the best
interest of the public welfare and for the protection of the public
security generally that said juvenile be required to stand as
an adult offender.
125
These criteria are taken from the appendix to the Kent opinion 21 setting
forth a policy memorandum prepared by the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court in 1959. However, at the time Kent was decided these published
standards had been withdrawn, apparently due to disagreement as to their
propriety.' 2'
123. 230 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967).
124. Id. at 325.
125. Id. at 325-26. Compare the approach of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
ordering the family court to formulate waiver criteria and submit them to the Supreme
Court for approval. Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767 (R.I. 1967).
126. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565 (1966).
127. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and
Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 1171, 1208 (1966); see also United States v.
Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 552 (D.D.C. 1965), where the judge reviewing the validity
of a waiver from the juvenile court noted that the guidelines had been rescinded and
proceeded to test the waiver decision in light of the age of the defendant (four months
short of eighteen at time of offense) ; found him "large, well-developed ... sophisticated
and worldly-wise," id.; that he had a seven year history of anti-social conduct showing an
assaultive and belligerent history; that probation in the past had not appeared to work;
his offense was an attack on an officer of a correctional institution; and that he had
disregard for authority. In sum, "[h]e has reached a point in life where he would not
be benefitted 'by techniques and procedures applicable to juveniles, and the likelihood
of his reclamation or rehabilitation thereunder is lacking the protection of society
[that] might be endangered if he were proceeded against other than as an adult."
Id. [sic] The court recognized the possibility of defendant's being sentenced under the
Youth Correction Act. See text at notes 70-79, supra.
Most state statutes, if they provide any guide with respect to criteria at all,
contain broad statements permitting waiver if the court finds "that such child cannot be
adequately controlled or induced to lead a correct life by use of the various disciplinary
and corrective measures available to the court ... " VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-177.1 (1960).
New Jersey makes reference to "habitual offenders," "offense of a heinous nature," and
"welfare of society." N.J. Ray. STAT. § 2A:415 (1952). The best statutory effort yet is
the recent amendment to the Texas juvenile act which provides:
(d) Prior to the hearing, the juvenile court shall order and obtain a
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Although the Indiana court stated its criteria in the disjunctive, the
context does not seem to indicate that any one criteria would, in itself, be
sufficient support for a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. Each is
highly variable from case to case. For example, we would not expect
waiver in the case of a sixteen-year-old honor student who has no
previous history of anti-social conduct but who commits a serious assault
on his chemistry teacher and sets fire to the laboratory. On the other
hand, the seventeen-and-one-half-year-old drop-out, with a long record,
with experience in correctional institutions, and who has been given
several genuine opportunities to benefit from juvenile treatment, and who
is stealing car radios not only for fun, but for profit, would seem a
proper candidate for waiver. 2
Most authorities seem to agree that the waiver decision should, at
least, be a function of the four variables of age, seriousness of offense,
seriousness of prior offenses, and discouraging treatment prognosis.
Also, the potential effect of the offender on the others in a juvenile
institution should be considered. In view of the generally unsatisfactory
state of juvenile rehabilitative efforts throughout the country, counsel
for the child should always explore exactly what has been done for the
complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child,
his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense.
(g) After full investigation and hearing the juvenile court shall retain
jurisdiction of the case unless it determines that, because of the seriousness
of the offense or the background of the offender, the welfare of the community
requires criminal proceedings.
(h) In making the determination under Subsection (g) of this section,
the court shall consider, among other matters:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with
greater weight in favor of waiver given to offenses against the person;
(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and
premeditated manner;
(3) whether there is evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected
to return an indictment;
(4) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(5) the record and previous history of the child;
(6) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and
facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
TEx. Ray. Civ. STAT. art 2338-1 (1967 Supp.). See also TAsK FoRcE REFORT 25.
128. Quaere: What if such a juvenile were to have been illegally arrested and in-
criminating evidence seized in such manner as to render it inadmissible in a criminal
trial? Or what if he gave a confession to police as the result of unlawful interrogation?
If it appears to the juvenile judge that a criminal conviction is unlikely due to the
probable exclusion of the tainted evidence, may he retain jurisdiction of the child?
Would not such retention be prompted more by punitive motives that a desire to
rehabilitate? Would it be a denial of equal protection of the laws? May a juvenile
demand waiver in such circumstances? See Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d, 214, 229
n. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Perhaps these questions will be rendered moot by the extension of
the exclusionary rules to the juvenile proceeding in the post-Gaidt era. See generally,
Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAm. L.Q. 1 (1967).
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child in the past. What was the nature of prior treatment? How frequent
were efforts made to work with him? Was he really given a chance to
"resocialize," or was he placed on probation or in a "training" school
and then forgotten?
The problem of waiver cannot be reduced to any simple formula, and
reviewing courts have their work cut out for them when it comes to
facing up to challenges to the factual basis of the juvenile court's waiver
decision. The criteria now finding general acceptance are based upon
assumptions which in turn may be based upon further assumptions and
even ignorance. A great deal of empirical research will be necessary before
we can begin to talk with any degree of sophistication about "waiver
criteria."
V. THE EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS WAIVER OF
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
A. Remedies for the Juvenile
Counsel may challenge a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in a
variety of ways, including a motion to dismiss the subsequent indict-
m6nt;129 appeal from a subsequent criminal conviction;1' writ of
prohibition;... and, of course, habeas corpus."' In cases where an
objection to improper waiver is timely raised, the problems are not great
since the case can be remanded to juvenile court for a proper hearing. In
some cases this may result in the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction.
A number of state courts have held that where a juvenile court is
granted exclusive jurisdiction, failure to comply properly with the waiver
provisions of the juvenile act deprives the criminal court of jurisdiction.
As a result, all subsequent criminal proceedings are void,"' and objec-
129. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552 (1966).
130. Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967); but see State v. Biggs, 420
P.2d 71 (Ore. 1966), holding that the waiver order was itself appealable and the right to
challenge was lost by failure to assert that right until after criminal conviction;
contra, Brekke v. People, 233 Cal. App. 2d 196, 43 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1965).
131. Flynn v. Superior Ct., 3 Ariz. App. 354, 414 P.2d 438 (1966).
132. Some courts have fashioned an end run on the problem of improper waiver by
finding the legislative grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to juvenile courts with respect
to juvenile offenses to be unconstitutional in light of a provision in the state constitution
granting to district or circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction in all "criminal" cases.
Garcia v. District Ct., 157 Col. 432, 403 P.2d 215 (1965) ; Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App.
730, 101 S.E.2d 621 (1957). Other Georgia cases to the same effect are criticized in
Herman, Scope and Purposes of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction 48 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMINO-
LoGy 590, 602 (1958). Is the "obvious answer . . . that cases tried in the juvenile court
are not 'criminal cases' . . . and that exclusive original jurisdiction with power to waive
was given to the juvenile court so that it could determine whether the case was to be a
criminal case . . ."? Herman, supra at 602.
133. E.g, Flynn v. Superior Ct., 3 Ariz. App. 354, 414 P2d 438 (1966) ; Trujillo v.
Cox, 75 N.M. 257, 403 P.2d 696 (1965) ; State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696
(1960) ; other cases are collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 663, 686-93 (1956), and later
supplements.
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tions going to the jurisdiction of the criminal court can be raised long
after conviction, and even long after the accused has reached adulthood.
Virginia, for example, which has been unwilling to give full recognition
to Kent,' has held that notice, hearing, and appointment of guardian
ad litem (but not necessarily counsel) are statutory prerequisites to the
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. But since the hearing and effective
assistance of counsel requirements of Kent are now constitutionally a
part of every waiver statute,"3 5 disregard thereof would likewise seem
to deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction and render subsequent
criminal convictions void. This appears to be the present state of the law
in Indiana. 3 ' Therefore, judges before whom young people are brought
for criminal trial must make careful inquiry as to their age, and as to
whether any waiver order has been entered in full accord with the
relevant statute and with Summers and Kent. Judges should not rely on
counsel to stimluate such inquiry.
Other courts have determined waiver orders to be non-jurisdictional
and, therefore, not rendering void subsequent criminal convictions.' 87
Therefore in the case of a juvenile, where the record does not support the
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, the trial or appellate court may re-
mand for a proper waiver hearing. If waiver is then found to have been
warranted, the conviction will stand.' However, in certain circum-
stances, a trial court may modify its sentence in the light of the informa-
tion developed on remand, or it may even require a new trial if necessary
to avoid prejudice to the accused." 9
Since many juvenile courts permit retention of juvenile jurisdiction,
once obtained, until the person reaches age twenty-one, 4" the person
may still be treated as a juvenile on remand in spite of the fact that
original jurisdiction of the juvenile court may have extended only to
persons under eighteen years of age. This point is somewhat complicated
134. See text accompanying notes 19-44, supra.
135. Id.
136. Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967); Hicks v. State, 230 N.E.2d
756 (Ind. 1967) ; Edwards v. State, 231 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. 1967). See text at notes 52-62,
supra.
137. United States v. Wilkerson, 262 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1967); Dillenburg v.
Maxwell, 70 Wash. 2d 325, 422 P.2d 783 (1967), -modifying 68 Wash. 2d 481, 413 P.2d
940 (1966). Cf. Brooks v. Bales, 153 S.E2d 526 (W.Va. 1967), holding that a plea of
guilty to criminal charges waived defendant's right to object to alleged improper waiver
from juvenile court. The general rule is that a voluntary plea of guilty waives all
non-jurisdictional defects. See, e.g., United States ex rel DeFlaner v. Mancusi, 389
F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. This procedure seems to have the approval of the United States Supreme
Court. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 564 (1966).
139. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
140. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3207 (Bums Supp. 1966).
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in Indiana by reason of the Summers and Hicks cases,"' which
require the proper filing of a petition to determine the delinquency
of the accused before the juvenile court can acquire jurisdiction in its
own right. The juvenile act requires a "preliminary investigation" and
authorization of the delinquency petition by the court "if [it] shall deter-
mine that formal jurisdiction should be acquired."' 2 Does this mean
that a hearing must be held to determine whether a petition should be
filed in the first place? And may the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and
any subsequent court to which the case may be transferred, be challenged
if it appears that the requisite preliminary investigation and specific
authorization requirements were not observed? Where a delinquency
petition is not filed before waiver as in Summers and Hicks, and the child
reaches the age of eighteen years before challenging his conviction in
criminal court, what is to be done with him?
B. The Problem of Juvenile Geriatrics
By the time the Supreme Court decided that Morris Kent was
improperly transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the
district court, he had passed the age of twenty-one. Because of this, his
attorneys argued that his conviction be vacated and the indictment
dismissed. Unwilling to approve such "drastic relief," the Court remanded
the case to district court for a nunc pro tunc hearing on the propriety of
the waiver :.43
[i] f that court finds that waiver was inappropriate, petitioner's
conviction must be vacated. If, however, it finds that the waiver
order was proper when originally made, the District Court may
proceed, after consideration of such motions as counsel may
make and such further proceedings, if any, as may be war-
ranted, to enter an appropriate judgment 44
141. Cases cited note 136 supra.
142. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3207 (Burns Supp. 1966).
143. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565 (1966). The District of Columbia
Juvenile Act permits the district court to convene itself as a juvenile court to determine
the propriety of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a sixteen or seventeen year oldjuvenile. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965). IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-3214 (Supp. 1966) confers a similar power upon trial courts to which
a juvenile case is waived. In other words, an attorney may request a circuit or criminal
court to convene itself as a juvenile court to hear de novo the evidence on waiver, and,
if juvenile court jurisdiction is deemed proper, the court may dispose of the case as
though it were a juvenile court. Presumably, the case could be remanded to the juvenile
court in counties where these courts have separate judges. See Watkins v. United
States, 373 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
144. 383 U.S. at 565; accord, Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767 (R.I. 1967). As to
the possible nature of "such motions" and "further proceedings" see Black v. United
States, 355 F.2d 104, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Another court, which has considered waiver defects to be non-
jurisdictional, has followed a similar line. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington in Dillenburg v. Maxwell4 . granted a prisoner's petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that he was not afforded a proper hearing
before juvenile court jurisdiction was relinquished. Insofar as remedies
were concerned, the court held that in cases where the petitioner was
under the juvenile court age limit, the matter should be remanded to the
juvenile court for a proper hearing. If the case is there deemed to have
been waived improperly, the criminal conviction must be vacated, but the
petitioner will remain amenable to juvenile court disposition. When it
appears that the petitioner is past juvenile court age, he is to be remanded
to the trial court for a proper hearing on the propriety of waiver, and if
determined nunc pro tunc that waiver was appropriate, the conviction
will stand "unless intervening events have so prejudiced the constitutional
rights of the convicted person as to compel a different result."' 48
But, if waiver is found to have been inappropriate for the person who is
now past juvenile court age "he is then amenable to prosecution as an
adult, and a new trial should be granted to him."'47 In Virginia, where
waiver defects are considered jurisdictional, its highest court has ruled
that in a case where a petitioner is over twenty-one years at the time his
conviction is voided for non-compliance with mandatory waiver pro-
cedures, he is amenable to new indictment.'48
These results proceed from the view that age at time of trial, rather
than at the time of the offense, is controlling as to juvenile court juris-
diction.' 0 Such rulings would raise serious speedy trial issues where
145. 70 Wash. 2d 325, 422 P.2d 783 (1967).
146. Id. at 789. The court gave no indication of what such "intervening events"
might be.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966).
149. Consider MODEL PENAL CODE, comments to § 4.10 at 19-20 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1957):
[a]s to offenders under 16 at the time of the offense it is implicit in the
treatment of the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a substitute
for the old rule of incapacity that age at the time of the offense should be
determinative. It would obviously conflict with the ameliorative purpose of
the 16 year criterion to permit passage of time between offense and prosecution
to sustain a criminal proceeding; time worked no such effect in cases of
non-age at common law.
But as to persons aged sixteen and seventeen, the drafters recognized that age at time
of proceeding should, on balance, control in spite of the danger of "Texas style" waiver.
The other alternative would be to clothe such persons with immunity if the offense was
not discovered until after they reach eighteen. But, so long as juvenile courts are vested
with jurisdiction to deal with the offender, the age at time of act should be decisive. It
can then waive jurisdiction in appropriate cases. But what of a person who commits an
offense at age seventeen and is over the age of juvenile court jurisdiction at the time of
the criminal proceeding?
[The Code] will in that case permit a criminal prosecution to proceed.
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
considerable time has intervened before the original conviction and the
second trial.15 Also, it seems implicit from Kent that if the waiver
determination is found, on the merits, to have been erroneous, the offender
has been deprived of significant benefits under the juvenile act, and the
state should not be allowed to hold him to account for its own error.
This was, of course, premised on findings of fact to be developed at a
nunc pro tunc hearing. But even this approach provides very little
protection to the person who should have been retained by the juvenile
court, but who now stands convicted of a serious offense. Judges under-
standably will be reluctant to find that waiver was not warranted in the
first place. On balance, the better approach seems to be that of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which ruled that a
California judge's waiver order with respect to a seventeen-year-old boy
not represented by counsel entitled the prisoner to unconditional release
when, six and one-half years later, he sought a writ of habeas corpus:
"the appellee, at age 17, enjoyed California legal rights which were inci-
dent to his youth. These rights have gone with the passage of time and
are irretrievable."'' 1
VI. Is KENT RETROACTIVE?
A. The Response of the Courts
The most important aspect of Kent, the right to counsel at the time
of waiver, should be given retroactive effect.5 2 Research has disclosed no
case in which a court faced specifically with the retroactivity of Kent, as
opposed to Gault, has ruled in favor of retroactivity.' However, some
This, to be sure, does not afford protection against delay in the commencement
of proceedings to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction. That danger is, however,
greatest in the very cases where the termination of such jurisdiction is
extremely close at hand, and these ...will be the cases where the juvenile
court would be most prone to waive. In other situations we believe that the
requirement of speedy trial and statute of limitation will normally give adequate
protection to defendants.
Id. at 20. The Code does not consider the problem of erroneous waiver. Compare TEx.
Rav. Civ. STAT. art 2338-1 (Supp. 1967).
150. But see State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W2d 696 (1960) (murder
conviction voided seventeen years after invalid waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and
retrial on a 1941 indictment not a denial of speedy trial).
151. Wilson v. Reagan, 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965).
152. On retroactivity generally see Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965);
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33
U. CH I. L. Rxv. 719 (1966).
153. Arrayed against retroactivity on the right to counsel point are In ore Harris,
64 Cal. Reptr. 319, 434 P.2d 615 (1967); Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256(Ky. 1967) ; State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162, 233 A.2d 326 (1967) ; Cradle v. Peyton,
208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967). See also United States v. Wilkerson, 262 F. Supp.
596 (D.D.C. 1967); Mordecai v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1966).
On the retroactivity of Gault, see In re Billie, 6 Ariz. App. 65, 429 P.2d 699 (1967)
610
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courts have sustained collateral attacks upon pre-Kent convictions because
of lack of counsel at the time juvenile court jurisdiction was waived." 4
It is true that most of the significant constitutional decisions of the
past few years have been deemed by the Supreme Court to be prospective
only." However, in the most significant of all right to counsel cases,
Gideon v. Wainwright,"6 the ruling was fully retroactive. This was later
explained by the Court to be necessary "because the rule affected 'the very
integrity of the fact-finding process' and averted 'the clear danger of
convicting the inoncent.' )11
In denying retroactive effect of the right to counsel aspect of Kent,
the state courts' reasoning proceeds as follows: (1) although the purpose
of the Kent and Gault rules with respect to counsel is to promote full and
fair hearings, there is no reason to assume that waiver and delinquency
hearings have been unfair in the past; (2) juvenile authorities have long
relied upon the old methods; (3) retroactive application of Kent would
seriously disrupt the administration of justice (i.e., turn loose or require
retrial of prisoners who have been convicted at an early age but who have
now reached adulthood);"5s (4) waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
has always been subject to review in subsequent proceedings in which
the defendant was represented by counsel; and (5) since a defendant
has always had a right to counsel in the criminal proceedings, denials of
that right in juvenile courts have not resulted in convicting the
innocent.'
In answer to these arguments it can be said that (1) the waiver of
jurisdiction practices in the several states have been anything but fair ;...
(2) customary reliance upon practices that are basically unfair and which
(retroactive) ; Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1
F m. L.Q. 1, 28-31 (Dec. 1967).
154. Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767 (R.I. 1967); Dillenberg v. Maxwell, 70
Wash. 2d 325, 422 P.2d 183 (1967).
155. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648
(1961) (held prospective only); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406(1966) (fifth amendment right to be free from prosecutor's comment on defendant's
failure to testify per Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prospective only);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (confessions rules laid down in Miranda
and Escobedo prospective only) ; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (right to counsel
at police line up per United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), prospective only).
156. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
157. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1966).
158. Cradle v. Peyton, 156 S.E.2d 874, 877-79 (Va. 1967). With regard to the effect
of Gault on juvenile courts if found retroactive see In re Billie, 6 Ariz. App. 65,
429 P.2d 699 (1967).
159. In re Harris, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322, 434 P.2d 615, 618 (1967).
160. See discussion of State v. Grubb, at text accompanying notes 45-57 supra, and
the full transcript of a waiver "hearing" reproduced in Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767,
774 (R.I. 1967) ; United States v. Madsen, 148 F. Supp. 625 (D. Alaska 1957).
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have affected significantly the rights of unknown numbers of young
people is an argument in favor of retroactivity rather than against it;
(3) we are told by experts that, statistically, the number of waivers is
very small 1-- moreover, before assuming "disruption," a state can
gauge the precise level of disruption by ascertaining how many people in
its penal institutions had been committed at a time when they were
potentially subject to juvenile court jurisdiction; (4) before Kent there
was no reason to raise questions concerning waiver, and, in many cases,
this probably never entered counsel's mind (even after Kent) ; .2
and (5) denial of the right to counsel may often have made the difference
between a child's being treated as an adult criminal rather than as a
juvenile. Also, the fact-finding process at the waiver level has been
demonstrated by the cases to have significantly lacked integrity.63
B. Retroactivity in Indiana
Even though Summers and Hicks involved direct appeals, the
Indiana Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant statutes, and its
findings of a lack of jurisdiction in the criminal court due to invalid
waiver, appear to be wholly retroactive." 4 Any prisoner now serving in
an Indiana correctional institution who was waived from juvenile court to
criminal court without assistance of counsel, should be eligible for release.
Those who already have served their sentences under convictions void due
to invalid waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction may apply to have those
convictions vacated.
C. A Possible Compromise
Courts which fear the disruptive influence of Kent's retroactivity may
adopt the approach of the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island,'65 and grant hearings to determine nunc pro
tunc the propriety of the earlier waiver. Such hearings must be in accord
with the procedural requirements of Kent. In those jurisdictions where
waiver defects are jurisdictional (e.g., Indiana), if, after such hearing,
the waiver is deemed to have been appropriate, the state may proceed
with a new trial only in those cases where the statute of limitations has
not run and where the constitutional right to speedy trial will not be
161. Advisory Council of Judges, Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and
Crninal Courts, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 10-11 (1962); cf. Harrison v. United
States, 359 F.2d 214, 229 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
162. See, e.g., Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967); Hicks v. State,
230 N.E.2d 756 (Ind. 1967) ; Edwards v. State, 231 N.E2d 20 (Ind. 1967).
163. Cases cited note 160 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 53-62 supra.
165. See note 144, supra, and accompanying text.
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infringed. 6 Where waiver is found to have been unwarranted on the
facts, a person still subject to juvenile court jurisdiction may be remanded
to that court for further disposition. If the person has passed juvenile
court age, he should be released unconditionally." 7
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems surrounding the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
over older children so that they must stand trial as adults are perhaps
miniscule when viewed in conjunction with all the problems involved in
the administration of criminal justice. However, for those who are
touched by the decision it is indeed critically important. Until that great
day when the light shines through; when we learn whether we can really
rehabilitate children or, for that matter, anybody else; when we are
thoroughly convinced by those who argue that rehabilitative concepts
should replace completely our punitive approaches with respect to persons
accused of crime; and when we are willing to foot the bill for all of this,
the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in "appropriate cases" will
remain a necessary part of the juvenile-criminal process.
The message of Kent, Gault and Summers with respect to waiver is
that no longer is the presumed "expertise" of the juvenile judge to be
relied upon without proof of the proper employment of that knowledge.
We, as lawyers and judges, must now learn considerably more about
young people so that we may begin to "tell it like it really is !"
166. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 149.
167. Wilson v. Reagan, 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965).
